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Abstract: This study investigates how disclosure of the board of directors’ 
leadership and role in risk oversight (BODs oversight disclosure) influences 
investors’ judgments when information on risk exposures is disclosed. The 
theoretical lens through which we examine this issue involves negativity bias. 
Sixty-two stock market investors who engage in the evaluation and/or 
investment of stocks on a regular or professional basis participated in our 
study. Our results reveal that the addition of BODs oversight disclosure 
(positive information) does not carry significant weight on investor judgments 
(i.e., attractiveness and investment) when financial statement disclosures 
indicate a high level of operational and financial risk exposures (negative 
information). In contrast, under the condition of a low level of risk exposures, 
BODs oversight disclosure causes investors to assess higher risk in terms of 
worry, catastrophic potentials and unfamiliarity about risk information and, in 
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turn, make less favorable investor judgments. Our findings add to the 
literature on negativity bias and contribute to the debate on the usefulness of 
disclosures about risk.  
Keywords: BODs oversight disclosure; investor judgments; risk-as-feelings; 
risk disclosures.  
 
Running Title: Negativity Bias in Investors’ Reactions 
 
“…As a Commissioner of a disclosure-based agency [former Chairman 
Laura Unger], I believe that more information is generally better. But 
is that always the case? (SEC, 2000)”1 
 
Introduction  
 
The 2008 financial crisis caused investors to critically question 
the role of boards of directors in managing firms’ material risk 
exposures, including operational and financial risks, and motivated 
investors to demand more transparency (Kirkpatrick, 2009; Lipton, 
Neff, Brownstein, Rosenblum, Emmerich, Niles, & Walker, 2010; 
Nicholson, 2009). As a response, in late 2009, the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) required publicly traded companies to 
report information on how their board of directors (BODs) are fulfilling 
a risk oversight role and interacting with senior executives to oversee 
enterprise risk management (hereafter BODs oversight disclosure). 
These disclosure rules are intended to benefit investors in making 
“informed decisions” (SEC, 2009, p. 4). However, research has paid 
little attention as to how BODs oversight disclosure influences investor 
judgments, instead focusing on documenting the state of risk 
management practices and the BODs risk oversight responsibilities 
(e.g., Beasley, Branson, & Hancock, 2010; 2011; Deloitte, 2013; 
Gates, 2006; Institute of Internal Auditors Research Foundation 
(IIARF), 2011; Raber, 2003).  
 
In this study, we investigate whether the disclosure of positive 
information related to the BODs quality and leadership role in risk 
oversight mitigates the effect of negative information about 
operational and financial risk exposures (hereafter risk disclosure) on 
investors’ judgments. We examine this issue through the theoretical 
lens of “negativity bias” (e.g., Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & 
Vohs, 2001). Studies in psychology have demonstrated that negative 
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information related to bad events carries more weight, elicits more 
information processing, and activates stronger affective reactions in 
decision making than positive information related to good events (e.g., 
Fiske, 1980; Ikegami, 1993; Klinger, Barta, & Maxeiner, 1980; 
Öhman, Lundqvist, & Esteves, 2001; Pratto & John, 1991). This bias to 
negative information has also been documented in financial risk 
analysis. For example, a disclosure of potential risk can elicit a strong 
affective reaction (Koonce, McAnally, & Mercer, 2005) and influence 
investors’ assessment of a firm’s future performance and their 
resultant investment decisions (e.g., Fortin & Berthelot, 2012).  
 
We extend the research on negativity bias by conducting an 
experiment that investigates how BODs oversight disclosure interacts 
with risk disclosure and influences investor judgments. Using a 2 x 2 
between-subjects experiment, we employ a sample of 62 stock market 
investors who engage in the evaluation and/or investment of stocks on 
a regular or professional basis (T𝑜̈ rngren & Montgomery, 2004). We 
present participants with a hypothetical case scenario adapted from a 
Fortune 500 annual report and proxy statement. In the case scenario, 
we manipulate the risk disclosure condition as a high or low level of 
operational and financial risk exposures and the BODs oversight 
disclosure condition as the absence or presence of information related 
to the BODs quality and leadership role in risk oversight.  
 
Our results indicate that under the high risk disclosure 
condition, participants’ judgments do not differ significantly when 
BODs oversight disclosure is present compared to when BODs 
oversight disclosure is absent. In contrast, when evaluating an 
investment opportunity under the low risk disclosure condition, 
participants make less favorable investment judgments in the 
presence of BODs oversight disclosure than in the absence of BODs 
oversight disclosure. These results suggest that the disclosure of a 
high level of risk exposures carries significantly more weight on 
investment judgments than information about the BODs quality and 
leadership role in risk oversight. On the other hand, when financial 
statement disclosures indicate a low level of risk exposures, the 
addition of BODs oversight disclosure works in a counterintuitive way 
by amplifying investors’ risk perceptions and discouraging investment 
decisions. Subsequent analyses show that under the low risk 
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disclosure condition, the disclosure of BODs role in risk oversight 
disclosure causes participants to assess risk in affective terms, where 
feelings of worry, catastrophic potentials, and unfamiliarity about risk 
information—i.e., Risk-as-Feelings (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & 
MacGregor, 2004)—explain participants’ judgments. Overall, our 
findings suggest that investors do not effectively integrate BODs 
oversight disclosure information into their judgments when risks are 
disclosed. The results fail to provide support for the notion that added 
transparency provided by the BODs oversight disclosure improves 
investors’ decisions.  
 
From a theoretical perspective, this study adds to the literature 
on negativity bias in the context of risk oversight disclosure and 
provides support for prior research on negativity bias in investors’ 
decision-making (Cianci & Falsetta, 2008; Ghosh & Wu, 2012). From a 
practical perspective, our findings contribute to the debate on the 
usefulness of disclosures about risk. This study should be of interest to 
regulators who are currently evaluating existing disclosure 
requirements (SEC, 2014) or revising a disclosure framework (FASB, 
2014) in response to users’ and preparers’ concerns about the 
usefulness of disclosures, the perceived disclosure overload, and the 
amount of disclosure content.  
 
In the remainder of this chapter we review literature related to 
risk disclosure, BODs oversight disclosure and negativity bias and put 
forth our hypotheses. We subsequently explain the methodology used 
to test the hypotheses and describe the participants, experimental 
procedures, and the independent and dependent variables. Finally, we 
report results and discuss their implications, suggest directions for 
future research, and point out limitations that should be considered 
when generalizing from our findings. 
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Background And Hypotheses Development  
 
Risk Disclosure and the Board’s Leadership and Risk 
Oversight Role  
 
In the early 1990s, significant derivative losses resulted from 
market volatilities in interest rates, foreign currency exchange rates, 
commodity prices, and equity prices. Those volatile markets, coupled 
with a lack of adequate disclosure about derivative instruments and 
their related risks, led investors to demand adequate risk disclosure 
(Linsmeier & Pearson, 1997; Schrand & Elliot, 1998). Since then, 
regulators have paid considerable attention to promoting and 
improving transparency regarding risks faced by companies (Linsley & 
Shrives, 2006), and firms have increasingly engaged in risk reporting 
as part of their financial reporting practices (Dobler, 2008). As a result 
of increased risk reporting among preparers and regulators, research 
has examined different aspects of risk disclosure such as usefulness 
(e.g., Bozzolan, Trombetta & Beretta, 2009), content (e.g., Dia & 
Zéghal, 2008), and risk-related corporate governance characteristics 
(e.g., Abraham & Cox, 2007).  
 
Additional studies have investigated types of risk categories 
(e.g., Linsley & Shrives, 2006), firm size effects on disclosures (e.g., 
Amran, Bin, & Hassan, 2009), and the prevalence of qualitative risk 
reports over quantitative risk information in annual reports (e.g., 
Dobler, 2008). Further, experimental evidence indicates that investors 
are less likely to invest in opportunities they feel have greater risk, in 
particular operational and financial risks or discrete areas of financial 
risks2 (e.g., Arnold, Bedard, Phillips, & Sutton, 2012; Dietrich, 
Kachelmeier, Kleinmuntz, & Lismeier, 2001; Dobler, 2008; Hirst, 
Hopkins, & Wahlen, 2004; Koonce et al., 2005; Lipe, 1998; Olsen, 
1997). Despite the efforts of regulators, policy makers, and preparers 
to ensure adequate risk disclosures, the 2008 financial crisis in the 
U.S. subprime market and the related liquidity crunch caused investors 
to become concerned about the BODs role in monitoring enterprise risk 
management (e.g., Kirkpatrick, 2009; Lipton et al., 2010; Nicholson, 
2009).  
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In response, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) adopted new rules that require publicly traded companies to 
disclose information regarding their BODs’ leadership structure and 
role in the oversight of enterprise risk management (hereafter BOD 
oversight disclosure). The SEC’s disclosure requirement is intended to 
increase transparency for “investors as to how the board functions” 
and improve “investors’ and shareholders’ understanding about how a 
company perceives the role of its board and the relationship between 
the board and senior management in managing material risks [e.g., 
operational and financial risks] facing the company” (SEC, 2009, p. 
42-43). By 2010, most publicly traded companies reported that their 
BODs directly and actively monitor, to some extent, corporate risks 
related to their companies’ strategic and business decisions (Goldberg 
& Harsch, 2010). In those disclosures, firms typically discussed the 
board’s leadership structure and involvement in risk oversight, with an 
emphasis on the role of a lead director or independent directors in 
monitoring corporate risks (Akin Gump, Strauss, Hauer, & Feld LLP, 
2010).  
 
To date, research related to BODs oversight disclosure remains 
rather limited as it primarily provides descriptive data about risk 
oversight practices. For example, a 2010 COSO-sponsored study 
reports that 42.2% of publicly traded companies had assigned a BOD 
committee with responsibility for risk oversight (Beasley et al., 2010). 
A 2011 AICPA-sponsored study finds that there has been a noticeable 
improvement in publicly traded companies’ BODs oversight practices, 
as 62.7% have a BOD committee monitoring enterprise risk 
management, but the extent to which the board reviews and discusses 
top risk exposures in the context of strategic planning tends to be 
limited (Beasley et al., 2011). A report by the research foundation of 
the IIARF found that public companies’ audit committees are assigned 
“the oversight responsibilities for 67% of the risks” (IIARF, 2011, 
p.17). A 2013 study by Deloitte shows an increasing trend in the 
percentage of companies with audit committees taking primary 
responsibility for risk and risk oversight (from 58% in 2010 to 64% in 
2013), and in the allocation of risk oversight responsibilities among 
various board committees (from 82% in 2010 to 91% in 2013) 
(Deloitte, 2013).  
 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Advances in Accounting Behavioral Research, Vol 18 (2015): pg. 33-68. DOI. This article is © Emerald (JAI Press) and 
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Emerald (JAI Press) does not grant 
permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from 
Emerald (JAI Press). 
7 
 
The Effect of BODs Oversight Disclosure on Investor 
Judgments: A Negativity Bias Perspective  
 
Studies from psychology demonstrate that negative information 
is more visible or noticeable, carries more weight, activates stronger 
responses, and has a greater impact on information processing than 
positive information (e.g., Cacioppo, Berntson, & Gardner, 1999; 
Fiske, 1980; Ikegami, 1993; Klinger et al., 1980; Öhman et al., 2001; 
Pratto & John, 1991; Slovic, 1993; Smith, Cacioppo, Larsen & 
Chartrand, 2003). Greater sensitivity to negative information is known 
as negativity bias (e.g., Baumeister et al., 2001; Taylor, 1991). In the 
context of risk analysis, people often assess risky situations by 
attending to negative information more than positive information. For 
example, Slovic (1993) found that information on a nuclear plant’s 
potential safety problems, exposure to a series of accidents, and 
health issue incidences (negative information) had a larger effect on 
decreasing trust (or increasing risk perception)3 for plant management 
than the effect of disclosure on the plant’s absence of safety problems 
or health issues (positive information) had on increasing trust. 
Likewise, the results of a study by MacGregor, Slovic and Morgan 
(1994) reveal that concerns about health risks increased significantly 
after subjects read a brochure informing them of potential health risks 
of electromagnetic fields (negative information) even though they 
were told that scientific evidence of health risks associated with 
electromagnetic fields is lacking (positive information). 
Evidence-related risk analysis also indicates that negative (or 
risk) information elicits more intense affective reaction than positive 
(or benefit) information (e.g., Ito, Larsen, Smith & Cacioppo, 1998; 
Slovic et al., 2004). For example, additional risk (or benefit) 
information amplifies the salience of risks (or benefits) in decision 
making and changes subjects’ affective or favorability assessments in 
accordance with the direction of risk (or benefit) manipulation 
information (Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic & Johnson, 2000). Further, 
empirical evidence related to risk disclosures reveals that a potential 
loss outcome associated with disclosed financial risks elicits strong 
affective reactions (specifically, feelings of dread), significantly 
influencing risk perceptions (Koonce et al. 2005) and performance 
evaluations and investment decisions (Fortin & Berthelot, 2012).  
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Based on prior research, we expect that disclosing potential 
exposure to a high level of operational and financial risks (hereafter 
the high risk disclosure condition) will draw investors’ attention to the 
risks disclosed and, in turn, elicit a stronger affective reaction when 
compared to disclosing potential exposure to a low level of operational 
and financial risks (hereafter the low risk disclosure condition). This 
quick and emotional response to risks is known as Risk-as-Feelings 
(Slovic et al., 2004) and represents investors’ risk assessments from 
an affective perspective (Koonce et al., 2005; Slovic, 1987). 
Considering the magnitude of effect of high risk disclosure on 
investors’ judgments, we expect that additional disclosure on the BODs 
oversight role in monitoring enterprise risk management will not 
mitigate the effect of high risk information on risk assessments (Risk-
as-Feelings) and, in turn, investor judgments. This is because 
disclosure of high risk exposures (negative information) will carry 
more weight in investor judgments than BODs oversight disclosure 
(positive information). This effect, or lack thereof, has been found in 
other contexts. For example, Anderson and Maletta (1999) found that 
risk judgments on material misstatements are greater when auditors 
are instructed to evaluate audit evidence in a high inherent risk4 
context than in a low inherent risk context. Under a high inherent risk 
condition, auditors’ assessment of material misstatement risk does not 
differ when negative internal control information is evaluated before 
positive internal control information (or vice versa) suggesting that 
high inherent risk factors significantly influence auditors’ risk 
judgments and positive internal control information has little effect on 
risk judgments. Similarly, Su and Chang (2010) report that, as the 
quantity of negative financial information increases, the purchase 
intention of investors decreases significantly more for companies with 
a positive corporate image than for companies with a negative 
corporate image, showing greater incremental effects of negative 
financial information on investor judgments in the former context than 
in the latter context. Based on this discussion, we propose the 
following hypothesis:  
 
H1: In a high risk disclosure condition, investor judgments in 
the presence of BODs oversight disclosure will not differ 
from investor judgments made in the absence of BODs 
oversight disclosure.  
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Under the low risk disclosure condition, contrary to the SEC’s 
intent of benefitting investors by offering greater transparency, we 
expect that the addition of BODs oversight disclosure (positive 
information) will draw investors’ attention to potential risk exposures 
(negative information). This bias to negative information (risks 
disclosed) resulting from oversight disclosure will likely amplify 
investors’ affective reaction to risks disclosed (Risk-as-Feelings) or 
assessment of risk exposures, causing them to make less favorable 
judgments compared to judgments made in the absence of BODs 
oversight disclosure. This leads to a second hypothesis:  
 
H2: In a low risk disclosure condition, investors will make less 
favorable judgments in the presence of BODs oversight 
disclosure than in the absence of BODs oversight 
disclosure. 
Prior research indicates that affective responses to a target or 
stimulus indirectly influence judgments (Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003; 
Lerner & Keltner, 2000). That is, while deliberating a future action, 
individuals process cues and anticipate outcomes leading to affective 
responses. These responses, in turn, influence information processing, 
where individuals tend to selectively process information that supports 
their initial affective responses (Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 
1994). Consistent with this view, accounting research has documented 
that investors’ attitudes mediate the relationship between disclosures 
and investment judgments. For example, Frederickson and Miller 
(2004) found that non-professional investors (MBA students) in a pro-
forma disclosure condition (both pro-forma earnings and GAAP 
earnings disclosed) assess an earnings announcement more favorably 
and, in turn, judge stock prices higher than those in a GAAP earnings 
disclosure condition. Further analysis indicates that non-professional 
investors’ attitudes (i.e., perceived favorableness) about an earnings 
announcement mediate the relationship between pro-forma disclosures 
and stock price judgments.  
 
Building from Frederickson and Miller (2004), Victoravich (2010) 
found that investors’ affective reaction to a GAAP earnings 
announcement (current year earnings increased 15%) mediates the 
effect of investor experience level on stock price judgments. 
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Specifically, unsophisticated investors (undergraduate non-accounting 
students) assess earnings announcement more favorably and, in turn, 
assess stock prices higher, than sophisticated investors (MBA 
students). The influence of affective state on judgments appears to 
occur more often in situations of low risk, where subjects have a low 
need for cognition and rely on simple judgment processes, than in 
situations of high risks (e.g., Anderson & Maletta, 1999; Maletta, 
1993; Maletta & Kida, 1993). For example, Rose (2001) found that the 
recall patterns of subjects with a low need for cognition are influenced 
more by induced affective states (i.e., sad or happy mood) than the 
recall patterns of subjects with a high need for cognition. Consistent 
with this finding, Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee and Welch (2001, p. 274) 
noted that “…feelings [affective reaction to a situation] may be more 
than just an important input into decision making under uncertainty; 
they may be necessary and, to a large degree, mediate the connection 
between the cognitive evaluation of risk and risk-related behavior…”  
 
Drawing from this research, we expect that, under the low risk 
disclosure condition, the effect of BODs oversight disclosure on 
investor judgments will be accounted for by investors’ affective 
reaction to risks disclosed—i.e., Risk-as-Feelings or risk assessment 
from an affective perspective (Koonce et al., 2005; Slovic, 1987; 
Slovic et al., 2004). This leads to a third hypothesis:  
 
H3: In a low risk disclosure condition, Risk-as-Feelings will 
mediate the impact of BODs oversight disclosure on 
investor judgments.  
 
Figure 1 graphically illustrates the relationship between the constructs 
and operationalized variables proposed in the hypotheses.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 here]  
 
Research Method  
 
We perform an experiment with a 2 x 2 between-subjects 
design where we manipulate the risk disclosure condition as a high or 
low level of operational and financial risk exposures and the BODs 
oversight disclosure condition as the absence or presence of 
information about the board’s leadership structure and role in 
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monitoring enterprise risk management. Outcome measures included 
participants’ risk perceptions from an affective perspective (Risk-as-
Feelings), attention to disclosure and financial information, and 
ultimately investor judgments. Descriptions of the participants, 
experimental procedures, and measurement of the independent and 
dependent variables are provided in detail in subsequent sections. 
Participants  
 
We test our hypotheses with an experiment involving 62 stock 
market investors who engage in the evaluation and/or investment of 
stocks on a regular or professional basis (T𝑜̈ rngren & Montgomery, 
2004, p. 150).5 Participation was obtained through contacts developed 
in coordination with an advisory board of the School of Business of a 
public university located in the mid-western United States. In total, 73 
participants voluntarily accepted our invitation, but nine did not fully 
complete the task and two did not accurately respond to manipulation 
check items. After eliminating these eleven participants, the final 
sample consisted of 62 participants (41 males), all working in areas 
that involve evaluation of and/or investment in stocks on a regular or 
professional basis, with a mean years of investment experience of 
12.16 years. Demographic data for the sample are summarized in 
Table 1.  
 
The 62 participants were randomly assigned across the four 
treatment conditions. We performed chi-square analyses and a one-
way ANOVA on the demographic data (Gender, Type of Employer, 
Years of Investment Experience, Undergraduate Major and Graduate 
Major). Table 1 shows that demographic factors do not differ 
significantly across treatment conditions (all p > 0.05), and that 
Investor Judgments across demographic factors do not yield any 
significant relationship (all p > 0.05)6, except for Undergraduate Major 
(p = 0.077) (not tabulated).7 A correlation analysis (see Table 6 in 
subsequent sections) shows that Years of Investment Experience does 
not significantly correlate with Investor Judgments (p > 0.10). 
Considering these results, our participants’ demographic profile 
appears to be adequately balanced across treatment conditions and 
demographic factors are not significantly related to outcome 
measures. Thus, we do not include demographic factors in further 
tests.  
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[Insert Table 1 here] 
Experimental Materials and Procedures  
 
Participants were presented with paper-based case material8 in 
individual sessions. They were not compensated and did not face any 
time limits. The case scenario was based on the annual report of a 
Fortune 500 company (a food manufacturing company) and a proxy 
statement with detailed information about risk exposures and the BOD 
leadership structure and role in risk oversight. The actual name of the 
Fortune 500 Company was replaced with a hypothetical name. This 
approach is similar to that used by prior research examining investors’ 
judgment and decision making (e.g., Frederickson & Miller, 2004; 
Miller & Sedor, 2014).  
 
All participants were provided with the hypothetical company’s 
background information, including the company’s profile and a 
summary of three-year financial indicators, and information on the 
company’s exposures to Operational Risk, Financial Risk, and Other 
Risks. One group of participants received high risk disclosure 
information and another group of participants received low risk 
disclosure information. See Appendix A for a description of risk 
disclosure information. Irrespective of risk disclosure condition, 
participants received the same information on Other Risks. After 
learning the company’s risk exposures (high or low), one group of 
participants indicated their perceptions of the company’s risk 
exposures (i.e., the absence of BODs oversight disclosure condition) 
while the other group of participants read the BODs oversight 
disclosure and then assessed the company’s risk exposures. See 
Appendix B for a description of BODs oversight disclosure information. 
Next, participants across all conditions received the same five-year 
financial summary information related to the company and were then 
instructed to make their investment judgments (i.e., attractiveness 
and investment). Upon the completion of the experimental task, 
participants responded to demographic questions, manipulation check 
items, and a number of debriefing items. See Table 2 for more 
information on the experimental procedures.  
 
[Insert Table 2 here]  
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Measures  
 
Dependent Variable: Investor Judgments  
 
To measure investor judgments, we employed approaches 
similar to those used by Lipe (1998) and Holt and DeZoort (2009). 
Specifically, we asked participants to indicate with what degree of 
attractiveness they viewed the hypothetical company’s stock as an 
investment opportunity (0 = not attractive, 100 = highly attractive) 
(Attractiveness), and how likely they would be to invest in the 
hypothetical company’s stock (0 = not at all likely, 100 = extremely 
likely) (Investment). Before hypotheses testing, we combined the 
Attractiveness and Investment items into one measure (referred to as 
Investor Judgments) because they are significantly correlated (𝜌̂ = 
0.861, p < 0.001). The Cronbach’s Alpha (reliability statistics) of the 
combined measure is 0.923.  
 
Independent Variable: Risk Disclosures  
 
Financial risk is the most prevalent category of risk disclosure 
across the 160 listed firms9 in the manufacturing sector of the U.S., 
Canada, U.K., and Germany, followed by market risk and operational 
risk categories as well as non-financial category risks (Dobler, Lajili, & 
Zéghal, 2011; Lajili & Zéghal, 2005). To simulate a realistic scenario 
based on an all-inclusive approach, participants were provided with 
disclosure information about Operational and Financial risks as well as 
Other Risks (i.e., non-financial risks).10 The risk disclosure 
information (i.e., Operational, Financial, and Other Risks) was based 
on the annual report of a Fortune 500 company (a food manufacturing 
company). We manipulated the operational and financial categories of 
risk as high or low by using sensitivity analysis. This approach is 
similar to that of Koonce et al. (2005) and provides explicit estimates 
of the potential losses in future earnings, cash flows, or equity that 
arise from the failure to manage risk exposures (Rajgopal, 1999). See 
Appendix A for a more detailed description of the risk disclosure 
manipulation.  
 
Independent Variable: Board of Directors’ Oversight Disclosure  
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The manipulation of the board’s role in risk oversight consisted 
of the exclusion (absence) or inclusion (presence) of BODs oversight 
disclosure. For the latter case, we used information about the board’s 
leadership structure and role in monitoring enterprise risk 
management (ERM) from the proxy statement of the same Fortune 
500 company, as it clearly provides information mandated by the SEC. 
For specific information on BODs oversight disclosure, see Appendix B. 
In addition, information on the board’s makeup, characteristics, and 
attendance at annual board meetings was presented11 n because this 
information is included in the proxy statement and because prior 
research has found that investors’ perception of the board’s 
effectiveness is influenced by its independence (Beasley & Petroni, 
2001), financial expertise (Gendron & Bédard, 2006; Norman, Rose, & 
Suh, 2011; Sharma, 2006), size (Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb, 2004) and 
number of annual meetings (Chen & Zhou, 2007).  
 
Mediating Variables: Risk Perceptions  
 
To measure risk perceptions, we incorporated the items utilized 
by Koonce et al. (2005). These items covered participants’ perceptions 
of: loss outcome (LossOutcome), loss probability (LossProbability), 
gain outcome (GainOutcome), gain probability (GainProbability), 
probability of neither an economic gain nor an economic loss 
(StatusQuo), precise knowledge of the risk by the participant 
(ParticipantKnow), precision of management’s knowledge of the risk 
(ManagementKnow), management’s ability to limit the risk (Control), 
worry (Worry), the catastrophic nature of potential loss (Catastrophic), 
and newness of the risk (Newness).12 Next, we conducted a 
confirmatory factor analysis to combine the items into distinct factors 
of risk assessment. This analysis resulted in a three -factor solution.13 
The factor loadings are displayed in Table 3. Factor one is titled Risk-
as-Analysis and includes perceptions of LossOutcome, LossProbability, 
GainOutcome, and GainProbability, all representing risk perception 
from the decision-theory perspective (Koonce et al., 2005). That is, 
risk judgments were analyzed and evaluated though the use of 
“algorithms and normative rules, such as probability calculus or formal 
logic” (Slovic, 1987; Slovic et al., 2004). Factor two is titled Risk-as-
Control and includes perceptions of ParticipantKnow, 
ManagementKnow, and Control, all representing perceived 
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controllability of risk (Koonce et al., 2005; Slovic, 1987). Factor three 
is titled Risk-as-Feelings and includes perceptions of Worry, 
Catastrophic, and Newness, all representing risk perception from an 
affective perspective (Slovic, 1987; Slovic et al., 2004). Cronbach’s 
alpha for all three factors was acceptable (all ≥ 0.790) (Table 3). The 
main variables and measures are summarized in Table 4.  
 
[Insert Tables 3 and 4 here]  
 
Analysis And Results  
 
Manipulation Check  
 
Results of a t-test show that the risk manipulation was 
successful, as participants, on average, perceived the overall risk 
exposure (OverallRisk) (Table 5) to be significantly higher (t = -4.579, 
p < 0.01) in the high risk disclosure condition (Mean = 61.83, s.d. = 
13.02, n = 30) than in the low risk disclosure condition (Mean = 
47.13, s.d. = 12.05, n = 32).  
 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis 
We performed ANOVA tests and correlation analyses on key 
variables to evaluate differences across treatment conditions and 
provide a preliminary evaluation of relationships. Table 5 reveals that 
participants under the low risk disclosure condition, on average, 
perceive less risk (Risk-as-Analysis, Risk-as-Feelings, and Risk-as-
Control) and made more favorable investment judgments than 
participants under the high risk disclosure condition. Results in Table 6 
confirm the positive correlation between the risk manipulation 
condition and participants’ risk judgments. Further, Investor 
Judgments are negatively correlated with Risk Disclosure (p = 0.001), 
BODs Oversight Disclosure (p = 0.056), Risk-as-Analysis (p = 0.059), 
and Risk-as-Feelings (p = 0.001).  
 
[Insert Tables 5 & 6 here]  
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Test of Hypotheses 1 and 2: The Impact of BODs Oversight 
Disclosure on Investor Judgments  
 
We performed a 2 x 2 ANOVA with Investor Judgments as the 
dependent variable and Risk Disclosure (high versus low risk 
exposures) and BODs Oversight Disclosure (absence versus presence) 
as independent variables. Table 7, Panel B, and Figure 2 show 
significant main effects of Risk Disclosure (F = 12.550, p < 0.01) and 
BODs Oversight Disclosure (F = 4.102, p = 0.047) and a significant 
interaction (F = 6.597, p = 0.013) between Risk Disclosure and BODs 
Oversight Disclosure on participants’ Investor Judgments.  
 
[Insert Table 7 and Figure 2 here]  
 
To gain a better understanding of differences in Investor 
Judgments, we performed planned contrast tests on Investor 
Judgments across the four treatment conditions: LR (Low Risk 
Disclosed)/Absence (of BODs Oversight Disclosure), LR/Presence (of 
BODs Oversight Disclosure), HR (High Risk Disclosed)/Absence, and 
HR/Presence. The coefficients for the contrast between LR/Absence 
and LR/Presence (or HR/Absence and HR/Presence) are -1 and +1, 
respectively, and for the remaining treatment conditions are 0. Under 
the high risk exposure condition, our results (not tabulated) failed to 
indicate significant differences in participants’ Investor Judgments (t = 
0.378, p = 0.706) between the presence of BODs Oversight Disclosure 
(Mean = 81.13, s.d. = 19.53) and the absence of BODs Oversight 
Disclosure (Mean = 77.27, s.d. = 31.02). In contrast, under the low 
risk exposure condition, participants’ Investor Judgments in the 
presence of BODs Oversight Disclosure (Mean = 88.07, s.d. = 22.78) 
were significantly less (t = -3.299, p = 0.002) than participants’ 
Investor Judgments in the absence of BODs Oversight Disclosure 
(Mean = 120.76, s.d. = 34.76). These results support hypotheses 1 
and 2.  
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Test of Hypothesis 3: The Mediating Role of Risk-As-
Feelings in Investor Judgments  
 
To test hypothesis 3, we performed a one-way ANOVA and 
Tukey’s HSD test across the four treatment conditions and found 
significant mean differences only in Risk-as-Feelings under the low risk 
disclosure condition. Specifically, the mean of Risk-as-Feelings in the 
absence of BODs Oversight Disclosure was significantly lower (Mean = 
83.9, s.d. = 23.1) compared to the mean of Risk-as-Feelings in the 
presence of BODs Oversight Disclosure (Mean = 121.3, s.d. = 37.5) (p 
< 0.05). In contrast, under the high risk disclosure condition, Risk-as-
Feelings (Mean = 178.5, s.d. = 47.8) in the absence of BODs 
Oversight Disclosure did not differ significantly (p = 0.907) from Risk-
as-Feelings (Mean = 169.3, s.d. = 39.9) in the presence of BODs 
Oversight Disclosure. Likewise, as shown in Table 5, differences in the 
mean of Risk-as-Analysis or Risk-as-Control from the absence of BODs 
Oversight Disclosure to the presence of BODs Oversight Disclosure 
were not significant (all p > 0.10), irrespective of high or low risk 
disclosure condition. These results support our underlying assumption 
that the addition of BODs oversight disclosure will amplify investors’ 
affective reactions to risk information when financial statement 
disclosures indicate exposures to a low level of operational and 
financial risks. 
A mediation analysis was subsequently performed as outlined in 
Baron and Kenny (1986). Our results for the combined data for both 
the high and low Risk Disclosure conditions show no significant 
relationships between BODs Oversight Disclosure and Risk-as-Analysis, 
Risk-as-Feelings, or Risk-as-Control (all p > 0.05). Due to the lack of 
significant relationships, results are not tabulated for the combined 
data. Following the initial analysis, we performed the mediation tests 
on the data split according to high and low Risk Disclosure conditions. 
Under the high Risk Disclosure condition, we do not find a significant 
association between BODs Oversight Disclosure and Investor 
Judgments (p = 0.686) or between BODs Oversight Disclosure and 
Risk-as-Analysis (p = 0.756), Risk-as-Feelings (p = 0.569) or Risk-as-
Control (p = .939). These results reveal that none of the risk 
assessments from the affective perspective (Risk-as-Feelings), the 
perspective of perceived controllability of risk (Risk-as-Control) or the 
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decision-theory perspective (Risk-as-Analysis) account for the 
relationship between BODs Oversight Disclosure and Investor 
Judgments, and that positive information on boards’ leadership and 
role in risk oversight did not influence Investor Judgments.  
 
In contrast, under the low Risk Disclosure condition, only Risk-
as-Feelings fully mediates the relationship between BODs Oversight 
Disclosure and Investor Judgments (Sobel test statistic = 2.6349, p = 
0.008). Specifically, the results show significant relationships between 
BODs Oversight Disclosure and Risk-as-Feelings (p < 0.05) (p21 in 
Figure 3), between Risk-as-Feelings and Investor Judgments (p32 in 
Figure 3), and between BODs Oversight Disclosure and Investor 
Judgments (p < 0.05) (p31 in Figure 3). When we control for Risk-as-
Feelings in the models, we find that the relationship between BODs 
Oversight Disclosure and Investor Judgments was not significant (both 
p > 0.05) (p31’ in Figure 3). These results support hypothesis 3 and 
suggest that BODs oversight disclosure causes investors to worry and 
perceive catastrophes and unfamiliarity about risk exposures, and 
make Investor Judgments based on their feelings toward risks 
disclosed rather than on an analytical assessment of risk or perception 
of risk controllability.  
 
[Insert Figure 3 here]  
 
Supplementary Analyses  
 
To evaluate the potential for attention to negative information in 
the context of risk disclosure, we performed a t-test on Information 
Usage per each category of information disclosure. Results in Table 8, 
Panel A, indicate that the usage of Risk Disclosure information for 
making investment decisions is significantly greater in the high Risk 
Disclosure condition than in the low Risk disclosure condition (t = 
3.529, p = 0.001). Further, the usage of Operational and Financial 
Risk Disclosure is significantly greater in the high Risk Disclosure 
condition than in the low Risk Disclosure condition (t = 3.405, p = 
0.001). In contrast, the difference in the usage of Other Risk 
Disclosure is insignificant (t = - 0.948, p = 0.347) across the risk 
disclosure conditions. These results provide support for the assumption 
that participants pay more attention to information with a high risk 
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outcome than information with a low risk outcome (e.g., Fiske, 1980; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Taylor, 1991) and suggest that Other 
Risk Disclosure does not contribute to the variation of Investor 
Judgments (or decrease the internal validity of the study).  
 
We also performed additional t-tests on Information Usage 
between the presence/absence of BODs Oversight Disclosure 
conditions. Results in Table 8, Panel B, suggest that participants with 
BODs Oversight Disclosure shifted their attention to oversight 
disclosure information and focused less attention to other types of 
information (i.e., risk disclosure and financial ratios) compared to 
participants without BODs Oversight Disclosure. In addition, regression 
analysis results in Table 8, Panel C, show that Investor Judgments are 
not significantly associated with BODs Oversight Disclosure under the 
high Risk Disclosure condition but are negatively associated with BODs 
Oversight Disclosure under the low Risk Disclosure condition at a 
significance level of 0.05. These results corroborate our findings for 
hypotheses 1 and 2.  
 
Conclusion and Discussion  
 
This study examines whether the disclosure of positive 
information about BODs quality and leadership role in risk oversight 
mitigates the effect of negative information about operational and 
financial risk exposures on investor judgments. We found that the 
addition of BODs oversight disclosure does not influence investor 
judgments in the high risk disclosure condition, but causes investor 
judgments to be less favorable in the low risk disclosure condition. In 
the latter condition, investors view the investment opportunity less 
favorably when they learn about the BODs quality and leadership role 
in risk oversight after being informed of the firm’s exposure to 
operational and financial risks. This counterintuitive result is explained 
by investors’ risk assessment from the affective perspective—i.e., 
Risk-as-Feelings (Slovic et al., 2004). Further analysis reveals that in 
the low risk disclosure condition, the addition of BODs oversight 
disclosure leads investors to judge risk in terms of worry, catastrophic 
potentials, and unfamiliarity about risk information (Risk-as-Feelings) 
more than in terms of probabilities and outcome (Risk-as-Analysis) or 
perceived controllability (Risk-as-Control) and may cause investors to 
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make investor judgments based on their feelings toward risks 
disclosed rather than analytical assessment or perceived controllability 
of risk.  
 
Results of this study are limited by our experimental design and 
constraints inherent in experimental research (Shadish, Cook, & 
Campbell, 2002), and therefore readers should interpret our results 
with care. For example, the experimental setting represents an 
abstraction from reality and may not allow participants to fully engage 
themselves as if they were in a real investment context with much 
richer information than that depicted in the case materials. 
Specifically, our participants were provided with a hypothetical 
company’s financial information, including disclosures on risk 
information and the BODs risk oversight, in a condensed version. We 
opted to provide this abridged version to make sure that all required 
tasks were completed within a reasonable amount of time. Although 
we pre-tested the instrument to assess if the content of the financial 
information was realistic and relevant for the task, the compression of 
financial information does not represent the amount of material that 
investors would have to process and analyze when making a real 
investment decision.  
 
Despite these limitations we anticipate that the results of our 
study will be valued by academics, practitioners, and regulators alike. 
From a practical perspective, this study contributes to the debate on 
the usefulness of disclosures. Our findings indicate that positive 
information about the board’s leadership and role in risk oversight is 
not effectively incorporated into investors’ judgment and decision-
making process, irrespective of a high or low risk disclosure condition, 
and does not lead investors to make “informed investment decisions” 
(SEC, 2009, p. 4). Our findings suggest that communicating risk 
oversight practices, particularly the role of the BODs leadership 
structure and role in monitoring operational and financial risk 
management, may also be challenging for firms with low risk 
exposures. From a theoretical perspective, the findings contribute to 
the literature on negativity bias in investors’ judgments (Cianci & 
Falsetta, 2008; Ghosh & Wu, 2012) in the context of risk and BODs 
oversight disclosures.  
 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Advances in Accounting Behavioral Research, Vol 18 (2015): pg. 33-68. DOI. This article is © Emerald (JAI Press) and 
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Emerald (JAI Press) does not grant 
permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from 
Emerald (JAI Press). 
21 
 
Researchers may also be interested in extending our study to 
provide a broader understanding of the effects of risk and BODs 
oversight disclosures. For example, our participants made investment 
judgments when BODs oversight information was presented after risk 
exposure information but not before. It is not clear whether oversight 
disclosure preceding risk exposure information will result in primacy 
(e.g., Anderson & Maletta, 1999; Wilks, 2002) or recency effects on 
investor judgments (e.g., Ahlawat, 1999; Ashton & Ashton, 1988). 
Future research could look into this issue. We also did not examine 
whether investors suffer from information overload if they were 
provided with information about risk exposures and BODs oversight 
disclosure or instructed to find disclosure information in the entire 
annual report. Future research could gain insight into the specific 
factors causing disclosure overload between those two conditions and 
examine the effects of disclosure overload on investors’ effort to 
process information (i.e., risk and BODs oversight disclosure) and their 
judgment and decision making. Finally, future research could also 
examine the impact of firm familiarity or non-familiarity versus 
immediate or delayed availability of BODs oversight disclosure on 
investors’ judgments, as well as identifying mitigating factors that can 
offset investors’ affective reactions or increase investors’ reliance on 
reason-based analysis. 
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Appendix A: Risk Disclosure Manipulation  
 
Participants received a detailed disclosure of operational risk 
and a sensitivity analysis of selling, general, and administrative (SGA) 
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expenses and cost of goods sold (COGS). The sensitivity analysis for a 
high (or low) level of operational risk exposure described that a failure 
to achieve a 10% reduction in cost savings would cause an economic 
loss of approximately 40% (or 1% in the low risk disclosure condition) 
on the company’s equity and result in severe harm (or ‘would not 
adversely affect’ in the low risk disclosure condition) long-term 
profitability and financial strength.  
In addition, participants received a detailed disclosure on financial risk 
and a sensitivity analysis associated with long-term debts subject to 
variable interest rates and commodity prices subject to future and 
option commodity prices.  
 
The sensitivity analysis for a high (or low) level of interest rate 
risk indicated that a 10%1 increase in the market interest rate would 
cause an economic loss of approximately 40% (or 1% in the low risk 
condition) of the company’s equity and result in severe harm (or 
‘would not adversely affect’ in the low risk disclosure condition) to 
long-term profitability and financial strength. The sensitivity analysis 
for a high (or low) level of commodity price risk indicated that if 
hedging prices are in excess of spot prices by 10%, this situation 
would cause an economic loss to the company in the amount of 
approximately 40% of the company’s equity (or 1% in the low risk 
condition). 
Appendix B: Board Oversight Of Enterprise Risk  
 
The Board utilizes our Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) process to 
assist in fulfilling its oversight of our risks.  
 
Management, which is responsible for day-to-day risk management, 
conducts a risk assessment of SW’s business annually.  
o The risk assessment process is global in nature and has been 
developed to identify and assess SW’s risks, including the nature 
of the risk, as well as to identify steps to mitigate and manage 
each risk.  
o Several hundred of our key business leaders, functional heads 
and other managers are surveyed and/or interviewed to develop 
this information.  
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While risk oversight is a full Board responsibility, the responsibility for 
monitoring the ERM process has been delegated to the Audit 
Committee. As such, one of the leaders of the ERM process is the Vice 
President, Internal Audit, who reports directly to the Chair of the Audit 
Committee.  
 
The results of the risk assessment are reviewed with the Audit 
Committee and the full Board:  
o The centerpiece of the assessment is the discussion of key 
risks, which includes the potential magnitude and likelihood of 
each risk.  
 
As part of the process for each risk, management identifies each one 
of the following key points:  
o The nature of the risk  
o The senior executive responsible for managing the risk  
o The potential impact  
o Management’s initiatives to manage the risk  
o The most recent Board or Committee update, and  
o The timing of the next scheduled Board or Committee review.  
 
In addition to the enterprise-wide assessment, each business unit 
discusses its risk assessment as part of its annual business plan review 
with the Board.  
 
The results of the risk assessments are then integrated into the 
Board’s processes.  
o Oversight responsibility for each risk is allocated among the 
full Board and its Committees, and specific Board and 
Committee agendas are developed accordingly.  
 
Each Committee chair has the following responsibilities:  
o Work directly with SW’s key senior executive responsible for 
the matters allocated to the Committee to develop agenda 
topics  
o Review materials to be discussed with the Committee  
o Discuss specific topics relating to the particular Committee  
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Through the above process each key risk is reviewed at least annually, 
with many topics reviewed on several occasions throughout the year.  
 
Due to the dynamic nature of risk, BODs has taken the following 
oversight/review actions to fulfill its oversight responsibilities of SW’s 
risks:  
o The overall status of SW’s enterprise and business unit risks 
are updated.  
o A summary of key risks is reviewed at each Audit Committee 
meeting and adjustments are made to Board and Committee 
agendas throughout the year.  
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Endnotes 
1 The Security Exchange Commission (SEC, 2000) press release concerning 
former Chairman Laura Unger’s comments on fair disclosure can be 
retrieved from http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch387.htm.  
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2 Major risk disclosure regulations pertain to accounting for derivative 
instruments and hedging activities (SFAS No. 133, FASB, 1998), 
disclosures about segments of an enterprise and related information 
(SFAS No. 131, FASB, 1997), contingencies (SFAS No. 5, FASB, 1975), 
postretirement benefits other than pensions (SFAS No. 106, FASB, 
1990), small and medium sized entities’ exposures to certain 
significant risks and uncertainties (SOP No. 94-6, AICPA, 1994), 
forward-looking qualitative and quantitative market risk (FRR No. 48, 
SEC, 1997), and transfers of financial assets and extinguishments of 
liabilities (SFAS No. 140, FASB, 2000) (Dobler, 2008; Koonce et al., 
2005).  
3 Distrust has been shown to be strongly linked to risk perception (Slovic, 
1993, p. 675-676).  
4 Inherent risk is the risk that a financial statement will contain material error 
or misstatement when related internal controls are not present or 
effectively implemented (AICPA, 2006, p. 1652).  
5 Hodge and Pronk (2006; p. 272) note that professional investors (analysts) 
generally have well-defined valuation knowledge and use their 
expertise to focus on financial information and disclosures that they 
perceive relevant to their investment judgments. In contrast, non-
professional investors (e.g., MBA students) have relatively ill-defined 
valuation knowledge and fail to identify specific financial information 
for investment judgments. Stock market investors fall in-between 
these two categories because (1) they are not as expert (or 
sophisticated) as professional investors who specialize in valuation 
analyses, but (2) they are more expert than non-professional investors 
as their investment experience stems from engaging in investment of 
stocks on a regular or professional basis as compared to non-
professional investors’ investment experience, which results from 
general business work experience and completion of business courses 
(Victoravich, 2010).  
6 Of the 62 participants, 17 participants work at investment banks, 17 work at 
commercial banks or commercial bank trust departments, 13 work at 
brokerage firms, 4 work in accounting firms, and 11 work in corporate 
financial positions.  
7 Despite the marginally significant relationship between Investor Judgments 
and Undergraduate Major, results of Tukey’s HSD test procedure 
reveal that the average Investor Judgments of finance majors 
(Mean=101.88, s.d.=30.19) is not significantly greater than the 
average Investor Judgments of accounting majors (Mean=81.38, s.d. 
44.62) (p = 0.469), business administration majors (Mean=94.50, s.d. 
28.21) (p = 0.957), or others (Mean=71.88, s.d. 26.72) (p = 0.124). 
Given the marginally significant relationship between Investor 
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Judgments and Undergraduate Major, we tested hypotheses using a 2 
x 2 design with Undergraduate Major as a covariate. The ANCOVA 
results are statistically similar to the results associated with a 2 x 2 
design without the covariate.  
8 A total of 136 upper division accounting and/or business major students 
from one public university and two private universities in the Midwest 
participated in a pilot test of the experimental material. Based on the 
pilot test results, we concluded that the experimental manipulations 
were effective.  
9 The 160 listed firms represent the largest economies with the largest 
domestic market capitalization in North America and Europe, 
respectively (Dobbler et al., 2011, p. 2).  
10 Non-financial risks disclosed in the annual report of a Fortune 500 company 
(a food manufacturing company) consist of regulatory risk, technology 
risk, food quality and safety risk, management risk, and intellectual 
property rights risk. This information was provided to participants 
across the four treatment conditions.  
11 In the condition with BODs oversight disclosure, participants were informed 
that (1) all members of the board are independent directors and 
former/current top executives of Fortune 500 companies with 
expertise and business experience, (2) Audit Committee members are 
financial experts (i.e., Certified Public Accountants), and (3) the board 
of directors held 8 annual meetings and all of the incumbent directors 
attended at least 75% of the total number of annual board meetings.  
12 Among the 13 items related to risk perception from the decision-theory and 
behavioral perspectives, we only used 11 items, omitting Voluntary 
and Immediacy. The question about Voluntary is related to investment 
judgments if a person is not aware of operational and financial risk 
items. We excluded Voluntary because we believe this question may 
induce early anticipation of investment judgment when participants are 
instructed to make investment judgments after evaluating information 
on risk disclosure and BODs oversight role, if required. The question 
about Immediacy is related to whether a person can ascertain the 
occurrence of operating and financial risk scenarios in an immediate 
future or over time. We believe that it is difficult to forecast how soon 
or late operating and financial risk exposure scenarios might occur due 
to the lack of specific disclosure information in this regard. As a result, 
we also chose to exclude this item.  
13 A confirmatory factor analysis was conducted on the items to test 
dimensionality using a VARIMAX rotation for Eigen values greater than 
1.0. The use of the factor analysis was supported by the Kaiser-Meyer-
Olken (KMO) measure of sample adequacy, which was in the 
acceptable (> 0.6) range (KMO = 0.653) (Hutcheson & Sofronious, 
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1999), and Bartlett’s test of sphericity, which was significant (p < 
0.001).   
